Are Jailed South Sudanese Politicians In Juba Part of the Arms-Bearing Rebels?

Photo: Nyamilepedia

Whether the detained politicians in South Sudan are rebels by guilt or association is a question that takes one down memory lane to unending local, regional, and international requests for their unconditional release. The eleven prisoners were detained in connection with what the government insists as a coup attempt, but one stoutly countered by arms-bearing rebels and their international backers as a concocted incident to crack down on political rivals by President Kiir and his government. The claims and counter-claims of what really brought the country to where it is at the moment are difficult to verify, but an underlying truth stands out understandably clear: these detainees may not be firing at anyone, but their actions before the war and their status as prisoners are part of a puzzle of violence presently ensnaring the nation. 

What do we know about the prisoners in question?

The prisoners were people who roamed the political and military scenery of South Sudan for years and could best be linked to events and positions they shone in order to understand their merits. Here is what we know about them: they were all members of the ruling party; many were high ranking members of the Political Bureau and National Liberation Council of the ruling party; many were illustrious military officers before independence; some held ambassadorial, gubernatorial, and ministerial positions in the government until July 2013; as part of the government, many acquired significant friends with international powers; many were suspects in massive corruption that once prompted the president to meekly send out imploring letters for a return of four billion dollars into the national treasury; prior to December 15th, they were actively behind the former vice president, Riek Machar, pushing for reforms within the party; and above all, they made it clear to the nation, on more than one occasions, that their party has lost vision and direction. 

After their dismissal from the government, they became staunch critics of the government – a critical moment that ushered in the war. In custody, they are Deng Alor, former minister for cabinet affairs; Pagan Amum, former SPLM secretary-general; Cirino Iteng, former minister for culture; Madut Biar Yel, former minister for telecommunication and postal services; Oyai Deng Ajak, former minister for national security in the office of the president; Majak D’ Agoot, former deputy minister for defense; Chol Tong Mayay, former governor of Lakes state; Ezekiel Lul Gatkuoth, former ambassador to the United States; John Luk Jok, former justice minister; Kosti Manibe, former minister for finance; Gier Chuang Aluong, former minister for roads and bridges. They are all accused of plotting an abortive coup against an elected government.

Those conversant with the South Sudanese liberation history could see why their arrest or release is thorny but important. They wield a significant influence on the country's power dynamics. Their arrest or possible partaking in the ongoing rebellion is a better recipe that should convince the region and the world that the SPLM had treacherously fought for the creation of the nation, and correspondingly, demolishing it dangerously. 

Technically, from the list above, the SPLM is wholly in custody or back in the bush, with remnants heading the government.

Since the detention of these politicians and the subsequent outbreak of violence, call it with a proper name as war, the talks to divert the country away from another protracted war have hovered over nothing but their 'release,' as demanded by the rebels. Although the government accepts the demand for releasing them, it argues that their release must go through legal scrutiny to clear them from the alleged coup attempt. Having thus stolen the process toward the resolution of the conflict, their weight in South Sudanese politics as well as the ongoing conflict - duped as ethnic conflict - cannot be ignored. What is important to ask, is whether these detainees are really rebels, or are being verbally bailed out from detention to join the rebellion by the rebels themselves and others who demand their release? Behind the walls of their cells, one could ask if they really hold the key to the ongoing killings, or got the mechanisms to actually end it? The truth to these questions will be known in the future, though it will be rather too late. Likewise, the truth will reveal if the rebels are using their detention case to implicate them in a comprehensive mess for a comprehensive solution.

What is obvious is that the government is determined not to release these detainees unconditionally; for the action will definitely qualify the counter-argument that what actually took place on the night of December 15^th in Juba was not a coup but a political fiasco. The government sees itself losing legitimacy in the eyes of the public and would rather maintain its consistency with the claim of a coup attempt. This, therefore, begs further questions whether guns are buzzing because of these prisoners and whether those demanding their release are asking for peace through more rebellion? That is, swelling up the rebels' ranks for better prospects for peace. It is a call that needs to be tested for its genuine peace desire for the people of South Sudan. 

With negotiations currently enduring in Addis Ababa between the South Sudanese government and the rebels, led by Dr. Riek Machar, himself a former Vice President dismissed by President Kiir in an across-the-board presidential cabinet dissolution in July 2013, hints are that rebels have no interest in a ceasefire if the detained politicians are not released as a precursor to serious and realistic negotiations on the cession of hostilities. Many international voices have, too, ringed out starting from the UN, The USA, and the East African region. They all urge, but most of the time, demand the unconditional release of the political prisoners. But then the condition of their initial arrest is the one that never fully gets addressed. 

Why were they arrested in the first place? It is significant to factor in that the conditions of their arrest preceded the circumstances so violent that the situation demanding their release at present is tantamount to the situation of their initial arrest. Following through carefully, the government sees no difference between the gun-wielding rebels and the detained politicians. Michael Makuei Lueth, South Sudan's Minister for Information, had once said the detainees would only be released if the court of law of the land determined it so. And that if found guilty 'they will be hang by the neck until they are dead.' The fact that the prisoners are gathering international sympathy, drives the government crazy while equally inherently impacting the peace process and the halting of the conflict. This is the prevailing confusing condition for those attempting to make peace for South Sudan through talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 

Is there any reason why Dr. Riek Machar claims the detainees?

This question allows us to look back at the minute before the disaster. Their boycott, together with Riek Machar, of the final sitting of the National Liberation Council, confirms his reason for claiming them. When the spasm of war binge ultimately birthed out in Juba on December 15^th, these detainees and Riek Machar were the immediate targets for the arrest by the government. Machar circumvented arrest as a cardinal suspect of controversy: coup d’état versus armed rebellion, the former being the charge for which the detainees are in custody for. Riek Machar mysteriously slipped out of Juba and headed straight to the state of Jonglei where he officially raised his voice that a military armed rebellion was underway. He also denounced the allegations of a coup, and as a substitute announced the illegitimacy of the South Sudanese President, adding that he should step down.  

In another twist to be regretted later or might have already been, he called for the toppling of government through armed insurrection and pledged solidarity with the arrested colleagues. He is currently believed to be based somewhere in the marshlands of Nasir; the seat of his 1991 guerrilla base, or in Akobo; where he directs the marching battles of the White Army (a horde of armed youth with faces dappled with white ashes from burnt-out cow dung) or in Bor, capital of Jonglei; or anywhere on other frontlines in the Greater Upper Nile region. ‘Forced to’ yet again make painful decisions to go to war in a controversial episode of rebellion-cum-coup d’état, a seasoned warrior like Riek Machar gathers no blame for jumping into the woods rather than staying put in the capital. He quickly assessed the deteriorating political and security situations in Juba and came to an impulsive conclusion that, should it implicate him, as it came to be, he would face severe charges of treason with consequences he knew literally well might cost him an ultimate price.  Hence, the bush and not the bullets were, to him, the only options in order to make strategic meaning out of the chaos.

The past in Riek's Present

In essence, Machar is well known for his rebellious past than his personality. Upon setting foot in Jonglei, he effectively became the head of a ‘second liberation’ – as he declared to the BBC some days after he left Juba - against what he believed was President Kiir surreptitiously nurturing a ‘dictatorship’ through manipulations of SPLM (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement) party processes. It is to be recalled that when he first broke away from the SPLM/A in 1991, his first grievance among several reforms he wished for, was a chronic dictatorial nature of John Garang who then headed the liberation movement. Next on his list was the challenge to a one-way ideology of the New Sudan which, to his dissatisfaction, deprived southern Sudanese a chance for self-determination exercise in any events of peace deals with Khartoum.  The SPLM and its army wing later in 1994 made the reforms through a highly-publicized National Convention in Chukudum but deliberately failed to acknowledge the pressure behind such reforms. Riek Machar came back in 2002 with the drop of the slogan of ‘Garang Must Go.’ It was shelved for another period. That period came with his departure from Juba in December 2013. Thereafter,  he said ‘Kiir is no longer our president, he has to go.’ 

Although Riek Machar joined the list of South Sudanese post-independent rebels - many of whom were lured back into peace through numerous presidential pardons - he made it lucid in an interview to the BBC that he 'never thought he would consider becoming a rebel again 'in his lifetime.' As was the case in 1991, Dr. Riek goes with a huge following when he leaves, especially his tribesmen. In the present conflict, he is seen carrying under his arm what was the SPLM Mainstream or Torit Faction, in which the current president of South Sudan was an important leader, and his designed and recycled SPLM Nasir Faction back to the bush, or precisely, back to Nasir. Those that remained behind are the current leaders in detention. They are yet to make their decisions upon release whether they are for Riek Machar's armed conflict or not. But one thing is unmistakable: the detainees were, and might as well be, his SPLM’s archenemies, better equipped to disagree with him than President Kiir himself. It will be a great disclosure later if it became perceptible that they too share his wisdom of democratic change through violence or drip away namby-pamby. 

Some of the SPLM politicians such as the late Dr. Garang’s wife, Rebecca Nyandeng (guided by the spirit of John Garang as an esteemed mother of the incumbent government and the rebels alike), and Pagan Amum, now jailed, were vying for the highest office prior to the turmoil that has now cost the country the lives of about 10, 000 people (according to Brussels-based International Crisis Group) and displaced thousands.

A critical look through the ruling party, the SPLM, before violence, showed a cluster of politicians playing the game of using each other. Riek Machar was using other party colleagues to oust President Kiir, while behind him, the party was using Riek to pressure reforms in the SPLM, after which he himself would be clandestinely ousted when the democratic elections for the party's chief take place. In turn, and maintaining the government's position of a botched coup d’état, Riek Machar seemed to have dressed all the plans up in the form of a coup. This, to prisoners, would be a surprise if indeed they were immune.

The war in which everyone is desperate and reeling wild in search of the solution has become the war to release the prisoners. "Cease hostilities and release the detainees" appears to be the catchphrase for South Sudan's overtly denied but covertly accepted ethnic conflict. Other voices are, however, needed to pressure the government to speed up the due process of law in order to set the stage for their release. When the tides settle on the negotiations table, whether or not in the events of detainees' ultimate release, achieving a ceasefire to stop bloodshed would be the only thing to count on. To some extent, as I wrongly rephrase John Garang's view of peace in the two Sudan, 'there is no peace per se, even the graveyard is peaceful.'

Presidential Guards in Juba: Mistiming The Nation’s ‘Zero Hour.'

               

Pic: SPLA soldiers. Photo by Lomoyatdit

The eve of presidential guards’ clashes in Juba on December 14, 2013, trailed the long-awaited convening of the Political Bureau by the ruling party, The SPLM; whose political party structures had adhered to linearity in the order and commissioning of business since 1994 when the first National Conventions was convened in Chukudum, Eastern Equatoria. The business protocol of the party had been to convoke The National Convention, a gathering of several hundreds of delegates nationwide; The National Liberation Council, which is composed of no more than 275 members; The Political Bureau, whose membership stands at 27; and The General Secretariat, from where the start of the party national activities work their ways upwards through corridors of intervening powers.

The year 2013, however, introduced confusing changes. In the least, President Kiir on November 15, 2013, made a controversial dissolution of the party organs, a very surprising move that indicated was aimed at SPLM heavyweights who were recently part of the government, including Dr. Riek Machar; himself a self-declared aspirant for the party mantle for 2015 presidential elections. Consequently, the convening of National Liberation Council (NLC), contrary to the anticipated Politburo, took priority but did nothing to alleviate already simmering political temperatures over party leadership. SPLM party wrangling on power had had an immense impact on the nation’s viability three years into freedom.

As the president lambasted his opponents in NLC with claims of non-deviation from the movement since its inception, his deliberate reference to the 1991 Bor Massacre (already apologized for by Riek Machar and reluctantly forgiven by Bor communities) perforated old wounds and succinctly proclaimed a national doom in front of the ‘prophet of doom,’ as he later referred to Dr. Riek Machar. From that point, armed elements commenced mistiming of events in what has led to the death of scores of people, both civilians, and military personnel. Civilians have so far become the underdogs, caught in the crossfire, targeted for no reason, or locked in their homes without food or water in Juba. Reports have hinted that the Jonglei capital of Bor had come under heavy gunfire with several deaths reported.

Either it was a coup d'état or security forces mishandling reassignments in their quarters, The SPLM has tarnished its reputation by putting innocent lives at risk. Whatever the truth in the recent government rhetoric, the rhyme and whine over state power from the leaders carry the blame for the current state of affairs in Juba.

South Sudan has a history of rebellions which had been made excessively ethnical during the decades of war of independence. It is a reality that can be seen in all aspects of life in the country. It’s, therefore, the responsibility of the SPLM leadership to have acquainted itself with this reality by urging leaders to refrain from using ethnic cards in their power manipulations. It is now apparent that the much-internationalized marginalization of the people had been put to an end with the achievement of sovereignty. The unknown components of democratization have proved so alien to South Sudanese governing guerrillas. Tranquil years starting from 2005 to 2013 sowed hope that the country was in the best stage of democratic progression. This is not to dismiss David Yau, George Athor, and other rebels who were dissatisfied with democratization processes, service delivery profanation, and grand systemic corruption. Yet, the country was, by and large, seemed hopeful.

But cynics had a point. South Sudan had nevertheless continued to offer messianic credence to many who predicted her current affairs. A lot had been said about the people of South Sudan before the nation entered a defining moment in 2011; when for the first time, South Sudanese became their own masters. Concerns ranged from the inability of the people to govern themselves democratically, to possible intolerance of human rights. None of those predictions failed to prove wrong. There have been concerns of possible ‘Somalization’ or ‘Balkanisation’ of the country. Such concerns were perceived by ordinary citizens as voices not so divergent from the clenched fists of a coloniser’s misconstructions of innate abilities of the people. But the people’s party has never been at par with them.

Many South Sudanese are not in the know why The SPLM has become such a demigod that politicians fear to exit or lose it. Clamouring for the SPLM tells ordinary South Sudanese that our guerrilla-turned-politicians have nothing better to offer when conferred with state power other than stressing liberation history through the party to predominantly uneducated masses in the rural areas. There is no reason why the politicians who are supposed to be judicious and charismatic shy away from forming their own parties to offer a formidable challenge to the ruling elites which, in fact, is one way to peaceful resolutions of political squabbles. There is equally no reason why the governing SPLM flayed party processes which are part of a democratic transformation. If the politicians have faith in the people of South Sudan; strong confidence and clarity on the policies they wish to implement for the people, then they should not have permitted the bloodshed for the past three days (Dec., 15^th, 16^th, and 17^th), and days to come.

To the South Sudanese army, civilians would have disciplined their politicians through the ballot box. You have mistimed their zero hour.

Abyei: Abandoned In Unilateral Referendum

Photo credit: Lwal Baguoot

Another summit has lately gone by without agreement between the two presidents: Bashir and Kiir over the future of Abyei. Abyei’s question had tumbled down to a two-man dialogue from both its international and national projection as a deciding region of statehood for South Sudan and possibly, Sudan. It is now an issue of table manners for the two heads of state. Since none of the presidents is ready to correct his manners, deadlock continues to rule. What is wrong with the future of Abyei?

Some people in the Republic of Sudan call it the Kashmir of the Sudans by, perhaps, inaccurately contrasting its geographical location, ethnic composition, strategic national security and resources implications, and religious affiliation to the region at the foothills of the Himalayas, which is controversially administered by three nations: China, India, and Pakistan. A very unfortunate comparison indeed! However, judging by the look of insanity involved in the two regions, Abyei could easily and sadly qualify had the decisive dissimilarity not been that of its history. By settlement, Abyei cannot and has never been synonymous in character with Kashmir. The notoriety of claims by Sudan through Messeriya transhumance is the problem of the area. Abyei is a region claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan. It sits perilously on the borders of the two staunched enemies (South Sudan, to Sudan, is the number two enemy state after the state of Israel). It has long been seen along with several other areas as a conflict flashpoint on the North-South borders of Sudan. Its inhabitants are, according to the 2005 Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement, nine Ngok Dinka, and others.

Ngok is a Nilotic section of Dinka broadly famous among other Dinka sub-tribes as Ngong Deng Kuol/Majok or Ngong Abyei. Historically, the family of Arop Biong through Kuol Arop and Deng Kuol or Deng Majok and other descendants in the line maintained the chieftaincy of Abyei in what was the volatile part of the last quarter of 19^thC and first quarter of 20^thC. This period, according to historians with authority on Sudan such as Douglas Johnson, was when the area experienced intense slave raids.

Pragmatically, Sudanese Arabs saw venturing south through Abyei as a mission of advancing Islamization to the rest of Africa by whatever means necessary. Most of the time, it was through aggression: slave raids, trade, accessing resources forcefully, or cultural conquest. Oral histories along the borders of Sudan and South Sudan bear no wickedness in stating that the coming of Arabs to Sudan has led to embittered relationships of all times. Along the borders, the Jieng, the Naath, and the Collo continue to tell vigilante stories due to unforeseen attacks. Security at the borders has always continued to be a blister needing caution even from the depth of sleep. Records reveal that an administrative transfer of Abyei to Kordufan in 1905 was a means to curtail or lessen aggressiveness towards Ngok. Aggression towards Ngok has mostly been engendered by the Messeriya section of Humr; now claimants of the nativity by transhumance through Abyei.  

Other inhabitants of Abyei are non-Ngok Dinka but those who have lived there for generations. These are the ‘others’ acknowledged in the Machakos protocol on Abyei. Note that "other" is an ogre of malevolence and a significant term of substance in Abyei’s case. The owners of the land, the Ngok Dinka, at their own discretion cannot shed off the term even if asked to do so. From "others," we get the presence of Messeriya Arabs in Abyei who are either historically a welcome group of individual settlers among the population or those who weaved into Ngok communities through intermarriages. If you ask the Ngok Dinka what others in Abyei are, they will precisely point out that so and so over there are the ‘others’ in their region. Ask anyone in Khartoum and the list may include the planes that fly above the region – a deliberate misunderstanding of facts. So, who are the real Messeriya in Abyei? 

From the snapshot above, it should be easy to place Abyei in its rightful place. As the month of October 2013 concludes, sureness and inviolability of life for the natives in Abyei will depend, for better or for worst, on the decision that will be taken by the majority. Indeed, emotions from failures of the AUHIP and UN Security Council have driven the citizens of Abyei and sympathizers in general to feelings of dissatisfaction, uncertainty as well as a bolstered enragement. Why would they not harbor these feelings when daily life in the region is a terrifying ordeal: full of uncertainty, deprived of the natural bequest in terms of oil resources, constantly threatened by Messeriya Arabs and for the unknown session, held between the two mystical states that would never ever agree on anything without coercion? Successive deliberations and negotiations processes have stalled indefinitely leaving Ngok community as in-betweens of Khartoum and Juba.  It is on these uncertainties that the citizens of Abyei have decided, stealthily perhaps, to hold an independence referendum to determine their national status.  

Of course, there is a worry. The plebiscite is eclipsed by anecdotal evidence that the Messeriya, armed by the Sudan government and given assurance that they too belong in Abyei, may likely cause a bloodbath. Also, Satellite images from Satellite Sentinel Project (SSP) of the Hollywood actor George Clooney and John Prendergast of Enough Project have reported extraordinary Sudanese military activities from their bases closer to Abyei. Sudan has a potted history of taking advantage of precarious situations. The invasion of Abyei in 2010 in which thousands of civilians were displaced serves as evidence. The killing of the paramount chief of Abyei, Kuol Deng Kuol, while accompanied by United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA) has further exacerbated the resolve to go ahead with the vote.

What is the position of South Sudan in this mess? The vocal push by South Sudanese politicians and notable figures had fuelled the desire for the citizens of Abyei to go forward with voting decision regardless of formal agreement on the matter. One is surprised by the South Sudan government's reversion in tone and support for the people of Abyei. Whatever eventuality that the people of Abyei may encounter, South Sudan should know that it is part of it. Denial of reality is simply unprincipled and dangerous.

It would have made rational sense if the two countries had resolved Abyei’s self-determination exercise in a manner that reckons responsibility and value of human life. Leaving the inhabitants of Abyei to decide their own fate is indistinguishable from entrenching inter-state animosity between the two countries and between Abyei and its Messeriya neighbours for eternity.  It is too late now.  

In answer to the question of the real Messeriya, consider that every year millions of passengers go through Heathrow Airport in the UK on their way to greener pastures anywhere in the world. If by strange happening UK votes to determine its fate, whether to go to Mars or remains on earth, it will be only the Whites indigenous and Chinese or Indian or African ‘others’ permanently based in The UK as citizens that will determine UK’s future.  Not millions of Chinese, Indians and Africans that go through Heathrow. The Messeriya on maroon cows passing through Abyei are comparable to the passengers on an Airbus A380 passing through the UK. It is the transit fee that is needed to be paid.

Ad Hoc Technocracy In South Sudan

Photo credit, owner. Pagan Amum, SPLM SG. 

Finally, the push has come to shove in Juba. In a move that dazed many South Sudanese as well as international observers of political developments in South Sudan, President Salva Kiir Mayardit had on 23rd July 2013 bravely dissolved his government. It was highly anticipated but vulgarly engendered by poor government performance and the struggle for power within the ruling party, the SPLM. The multiple presidential decrees relieved the vice president, 29 ministers, 29 deputy ministers, and 17 brigadier generals in the police force. Another promised an overhaul of the government ministries while the SPLM Party Order suspended the Secretary-General of the SPLM. The SG, in another capacity, functioned as the chief negotiator in the post-independent arrangements with Sudan

As could be construed in these shake-ups, all efforts seemed to have been designed to prioritize the efficiency of the government. However, punishing dissent and rewarding supporters often go along with situations of this nature. It will be clear in the formation of the next government if all intentions were for the good of the nation or actions that are circumspect disciplinary among the SPLM's heavyweights.  The dissolution has already been believed by many as targeting the removal of the vice president, Riek Machar Teny, who had on numerous occasions, criticized the government while voicing his wish to lead the party into the next elections. 

The president's application of his constitutional prerogative was the second since he took power as the new country's first bearer of the highest office after independence. He had reshuffled the same government in 2010, but with the least panic from the street. Many more were expected but did not materialize. As some residents in Juba confirmed, the situation had since changed. The city remained tense, making the likelihood for a small bang of any kind to disrupt the day. On the other hand, citizens who have been calling out for the government to do more are now shy of praise even though their wishes are being slowly fulfilled. The need for effective service delivery had been overshadowed by fear of violent reprisal from the demoted government officials who might be left out of the incoming government, especially from the outgoing Vice President and his supporters. However, I am of the belief that Riek Machar had done his calculations correctly, and the presumptions many might have for him – especially his penchant for power in which he often applies violence in its pursuit –  have something to do with his past, not his present. But who can testify for Riek? He is a man cut for his own desires and might do exactly what people think he couldn't. 

Cognizant of the oil shutdown and the war with the Sudan in Panthou, South Sudanese see this second reshuffle as exceedingly bizare but on equal terms with previous actions in which proper plans were reserved to be attempted afterwards. The plan is now for the president to sit down with his advisers and do the mammoth task of selecting the new cabinet while the government in Juba remains literally in the hands of technocrats in the respective ministries. It was simple to set the pace of restructuring, but the enormity of the task at hand might likely require weeks to complete. That would leave a vacuum for possible unruliness. The president must act fast and in the approved manner in his formaton of a new government.

Can the president be encouraged to be a little harder? If President Kiir is to be beleived and trusted, he has to do a bit more. Whether internal party wrangling for leadership might have caused the dissolution, South Sudanese and the world are wishing to see that the 75 officials whom he sent letters to return the stolen US$4 billion must not show faces in the next government.  Of course, if the wells of the decrees have not run dry, expectations are that few remaining decrees must be channeled towards the formation of investigation committees to probe the whereabouts of US$4 billion for the benefit of the impoverished citizens. 

Boma That Fell: The ‘Al-Qaeda’ of SSDA Rebellion

The South Sudanese town of Boma in Pibor County had fallen to South Sudan Democratic Army, SSDA, a gubernatorial rebellion led by David Yau. The same month, May 2013, the South Sudanese army at the frontline in Pibor demonstrated uncharacteristic display by abandoning positions at the frontline and going on a looting spree in Pibor itself as many reports propose. Other incidences of civil disorder staged by the retreating army from Pibor have been reported on the outskirts of Bor town, the state capital.

Although the army behaviour could not be delinked from poor performance in service delivery and logistical negligence, the fall of Boma plateau is remarkably atypical. It is possibly the very first time that a military incursion into the SPLA/M Boma had merely lasted for minutes, if not hours, after which her inhabitants are sent helter-skelter into the immediate surroundings or merciless Tingily semi-desert. It is implausibly difficult to put thoughts together in determining the underlying circumstances that led to the easy slip of Boma into the hands of the militia. The South Sudanese media and the military seemed to have also resigned to the fall of Boma. No one knows if Boma has been abandoned only for a season or for eternity.

This raised questions whether the softly captured and eerily whispered Boma in the news was the same Boma that served as the springboard into Eastern Equatoria by East Equatoria Axis in 1980s? Was this the Boma so known to Major Nyachigak Nyachiluk, Lt Colonel Martin Manyiel Ayuel, commander Kuol Amum, Commander Gilario Modi Hurnyang, and Bol Madut or the Kiswahili ‘boma’ the homestead? South Sudanese who have wandered the bushes of South Sudan during the war for the total liberation of southern Sudan are perhaps asking these questions. One convincing answer rests in the reasoning that the mentality about the importance of Boma has increasingly become elusive to leaders and the military. The Boma of today is not synonymous anymore to the Boma of yore.

The Boma of today, the Boma of South Sudanese regular and paid army, the Boma that could be captured, and the course of history would never change, the liberated and outlandish Boma of logistical clumsiness and of command and control debacles was probably the Boma that fell. This is the Boma that nobody cares if it is overrun a thousandfold for it will forever be in South Sudan. Welcome then to Jebel Buma, the Upper and Lower Boma, ‘Boma Up and Boma Down’ (as Kuol Manyang, the defense minister put it), the SPLA and SSDA Berlin divided by ridges.

The Boma of old was a different bush town, too daring to meddle with and too comfortable to hold on to. It became the recuperating point for recruits and refugees crossing Sahara Tingily either way between Ethiopia and South Sudan. Incarcerated SPLA/M political prisoners like Arok Thon Arok, Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, and others had their home at Upper Boma. At an elevation of about 1100 meters above sea level, anyone defending it had an eye view of the attackers and wielding a demigod power to rain munitions on them. During the dry season, her surrounding semi-desert was always a deeply cracked and waterless alluvial soil; a hell of a place not only to thirsty humans but also to animals. Boma was undeniably impermeable to alien forces. The SPLA forces stormed it once and battled for its defense countable times.  

It was Major Bior Ajak, famous as Tahir Bior Abdala Ajak, who commanded the Neran battalion that forcefully entered Boma for the first time in the early 1980s and established a command base for Eastern Equatoria Axis. The SPLA/M Movement was at the time arching out military operational fronts throughout Southern Sudan. Since that time, Boma never fell to Jellaba and their allies. One proven historical wartime reality had for years stood unremittingly opposed to the quick fall of the area to external invasion after its initial capture: elevation of Boma itself. The town or a post had always served as a defensive armory to her inhabitants throughout the twenty-one years of war, particularly where there was a will to defend it. That willpower is unquestionably dwindling much to the forgetfulness of the eminence of the area as a national heritage.

The prominence of the Boma plateau and its national importance in South Sudan is as historical as it is strategically significant. Boma is the hub of wildlife diversity in South Sudan, expanding in the area to about 2300000ha, probably followed by Chelkou. It is an area of vast resources that a nation could tap into for economic gains and progress. Little known to many is the botanical implication of Boma. Boma has a profusion of Coffee Arabica grows in its rain forest ecosystem as a wild plant. This is a rare gift of nature that ought to keep Boma within the government’s arm’s length for resource mobilization and development in the country. It was first noticed in colonial Sudan in the 1930s by a botanist, Dr. A.S. Thomas. He later wrote an academic paper in 1942 entitled: “The wild Arabica coffee on the Boma Plateau, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.” After that, Boma slipped into the Sudanese negligence of her multiple marginalities. So if anyone feels the compulsion to tabulate the regions of national importance in South Sudan, Boma will, for a reason to be defended, jostle in the second place after oil fields.

There are veritable corollaries of the fall of Boma to Yau Yau rebel forces but one is of particular concern:  the Potentiality for the expansion of broad-based rebellion that might recruit, not only from the Murle but also from other local population in the area. Boma is home to Murle, Kishipo/Suri and Anyuak. It is therefore indispensable to worry for invariable reasons since the ethnic composition of Boma is that of a people who have never been friends, but may find a unifying factor in Yau Yau. He could use Murle pastoralists to forcefully recruit sedentary agriculturalists Kishipo and Anyuak. 

A biblical maxim states that a prophet is not accepted in his hometown. Yau Yau’s testimonial of seriousness in South Sudan would likely be felt when he exerts control over Murle’s adjacent communities. The probable outcome would be an establishment of a base - the Al Qaeda of the rebellion. If this happens, Juba might not have to worry about Boma but Pachalla, Jebel Raid, and Pakok/Korchum without forgetting the support Yau Yau might get among the Taposa. Effectively, Juba would be cut off from the Ethiopian and Kenyan Borders closest to it. 

This move could completely turn the tables on summary ‘amnesties’ that the government is fond of extending. Often such amnesties have only served to build personalities than to provide credible solutions. There is proven belief going around that ‘if you want to be a Major-General in the South Sudanese army, first be a rebel.’ Well, a rebel one might be and Major General one might win, but certainly what angers a civilian to take up arms in the first instance may get him into the woods again albeit heavily laden with military titles. Yau Yau is a case in point.

From Gumuruk, the village town of one blue mountain, Yau Yau the pastoralist and theologian is presently in the mountains of ‘Boma Up’ Plateau. Opposite to his theological training as a preserver of souls, he is slaying people up there. The South Sudanese army must do a lot more to bring him to ‘Boma Down’ and out of town.

Wau Casualties of Taking Towns to People

Just like the time of Jervas Yak ubango, acting governor of Bahr el Ghazal during the premiership of Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub (1965-1966, 1967-1969), and on a completely differential paradox, the city of Wau on Sunday 9^th December 2012, witnessed death in yet another horrible setting.

It all began with Western Bahr El Ghazal State governor, Mr. Rizik Zakaria Hassan’s cabinet decision to transfer Wau County headquarters to Bagari, about 12 miles Southwest of Wau town, in an apparent reckoning of taking services closer to people. The decision had made the local town dwellers uneasy, prompting them to take to the streets in protest. The ensued drama was a horrendous nightmare. A video coming out from Aljazeera English Channel clearly shows people with guns firing into the crowds of unarmed civilians, many on foot, some on bicycles, and others on motorbikes.  The dead are seen on the ground in pools of blood in the aftermath of the shooting. South Sudan government and the police are yet to agree on who did the killing. Whichever side will take the responsibility; the action was unacceptable and unpatriotic. The defensive governor, Rizik Zachariah Hassan, was on record denying that the demonstrators were killed in the clash with the police - or the army. Earlier the minister of Information and Communications, Mr. Derik Alfred Uya, said that about eight people were killed.  Numerical flaws sway between 25 deaths and the number that Mr. Derek had put forward. In fairness, he had outperformed the governor who denied in totality that any of the protesters were killed. Why did a simple street protest that teargas with batons might solve attract the full gallantry of the police? The anger shown by protesters, as alleged, in setting ablaze what was in the way could have risen to such height due to slackness in conveying to the people the decision of the cabinet to move the headquarters out of town.

One was stunned to see the repeat in South Sudan of South African police heavy-handedness, which characterized the apartheid regime and more recently, during the Lonmin’s Marikana platinum mine in which the police gunned down thirty-four miners in cold blood. South Sudan government and Western Bahr el Ghazal government, in particular, ought to do better than allow the civilians to die for the decision that should have been communicated smoothly to the people. Had the transfer of the headquarters been thoroughly and candidly put to the people, this incident could have been averted. The wanton use of force by the police will serve as a signal that the life of the citizens is of little value. Wau and its authorities must chart a different trend in order not to bring to memories massacres that nearly made it the city of death in the past.

Similar incidences had occurred in Wau before, in which authorities had acted out of malice on people. But the circumstances were different. One of these incidences is easy to recall from history. On the night of July 11, 1965, two cousins, Cypriano Cier and Ottavio Deng Maroro Rian wedded two sisters and daughters of a prominent chief, Benjamin Lang Juk. The wedding took place in Wau cathedral whereupon a double wedding party was announced. Many southern intellectuals were invited to the party. The government of premier Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub saw it fit to exterminate southern intellectuals at one sweep since southern Sudan was then a war zone and activities of the Anya Nya needed to be curbed. The difference between a southerner in town and those of the outlaws Anya Nya in the bush was proving difficult. To end the southern quest for a free country, the best way to do it was to cut off the head of the southern region through her knowledgeable cadres. It follows that the wedding party was surrounded at night by the army and everyone, including the brides and bridegrooms, was massacred. Wau woke up on the 12^th July 1965 to a sobering count of seventy-six dead people, forty-nine of whom were southern government officials.

Jervas Yak Ubango, the acting governor who was revered as a high-quality public administrator, was forced by the government to deny the occurrence of the incident. He, in his own right, luckily escaped death earlier that night by leaving the venue just minutes before the killing occurred. In facts twisting, typical of Sudanese politicians, Sayed Ahmed al- Mahdi, minister of interior said the army had to shoot because some of the outlaws were planning to attack the armed forces and were using the wedding as a launching pad, and that they searched the party venue and have found weapons and ammunition. Al-Ayam newspaper on the ground disapproved the minister’s allegation of the plan to attack the town as well as the presence of the outlaws in the wedding party. The paper was shut down for its defiance.

Unlike Wau of the 1960s, home to wolves and sheep, Wau of the modern era is expected to play a critical role in spreading development, not to serve as a city of terror anymore. If Dr. John Garang were to be alive, his astonishment in witnessing the first casualties of his aphorism of taking towns to people vis-à-vis the popular expectation of the reverse would be eminent. Garang suggested the idea in president Kibaki’s State House, Nairobi in 2005 and in presence of many African and world’s dignitaries and heads of states and governments during the signing of Six Machakos Protocols. For South Sudanese present at the time, it was sweet on the ears. The harbinger of towns coming to the villages was what was needed, or expected so as to realize the fullest of freedom.

When Garang made the statement, however, the pressing issue was the reality of peace coming to the old towns. General Lazarus Sumbeiywo, IGAD envoy in charge of the Sudanese peace process had just completed his tactical knowledge of bush dashing and had managed to bring the parties to peace together to sign the penultimate documents, which were to pave the way towards the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It was at the State House in Nairobi that the merry-go-round came to full circle. Because of fear that the Sudanese were infiltrating the negotiating delegations every time an agreement was about to be stroke and causing delays and possible stall, Sumbeiywo had moved negotiations venue from Naivasha, Machakos, Nyanuki and finally to Nairobi thereby confining the fly-in-fly-out parallel negotiators from Khartoum to hotels. This, for records, saw the success of peace succeeded, and as a consequence made the CPA "The Nairobi Agreement." It would have been the "Washington Agreement" had the IGAD committee accepted president Bush’s request to have it signed in the White House.

In truth, peace was coming. To many who had never been to towns in the old Sudan, the idea of towns coming home in the villages was just right. At least the overweening behaviour of town folks would come to an end when the country achieves independence. No one would again ask anyone about having been to Juba, Wau, etc. In fact, it would be the village folks that would be asking themselves if towns have come to their villages. But a few must have given it an indebt reflection if it would involve administrative reordering and shifting. Indeed, following this lack of knowledge, what happened in Wau had doled out that there must have been a belief in a cheeky hypothesis that towns would be built from scratch and people asked to inhabit them in full functioning. It is a terrible misunderstanding! However, Wau is a city of controversies where death en masse had horrific historical precedence.

And The Question is: What killed Isaiah Abraham?

On December 5th, 2012, a day that has become one of the drabbest days in South Sudan, and particularly bloodcurdling within the circles of the intellectuals and the media, Isaiah Abraham was killed in the coldest of the night by, thus far, unknown assailants. The brutal killing of Isaiah Abraham - a real person whose real name had been wrongly understood to be a cognomen for Isaiah Diing Abraham Chan Awol - a political commentator and a government critic from within, shook the nation that Wednesday morning. Many thought Isaiah Abraham, a name familiar to many readers of South Sudanese sociopolitical and economic commentaries, was that of a coward guy hiding behind a pseudonym. But he wasn’t. As an ordained Christian pastor and born of a Christian family that follows baptismal renaming cult, Isaiah had nothing hidden in who he was. In actual fact, he was just he: Isaiah Abraham.

It is believed that Isaiah was confronted in his house in the wee hours of the morning and was physically assaulted and eventually silenced by the barrel of a gun. Family, friends, and his readers were crumbled by the news of his death. Dark clouds hang over freedom of expression as well, for Isaiah could only die through what he writes. Those who were greatly affected were members of the South Sudanese blogosphere who intuitively felt the urge by the country’s sheer lack of development in its wholesomeness (physical infrastructure, change in attitudes, psychological development, ideological development, social development, etc.), and who wished to save the country by offering advice from a politically non-allied perspective. They had initially thought that the gunmen might now need the intellectuals to push the nation to its credible viability. But on this day they were wrong. The brutal death of Isaiah Abraham left many querying where in the world would enduring stability and development of a nation not require the two polarities to cooperate and coexist? Following the news of the death of Isaiah Abraham, there appeared to be no room for intellectual comments in South Sudan. Never had it crossed anyone's mind that the penman, usually located within the capitals: Juba, Torit, Malakal, Aweil, Bor, Yambio, Bentiu, Abyei, Rumbek, Kuacjok; and in the diaspora, would inadvertently enter into war with the gunmen. Such seems to be the unfolding state of affairs.  It is hinted that Isaiah Abraham had received threatening phone calls before he was eventually hunted down and killed. The queerness of it all is that threats have continued to be issued to others after him.

There are people who say they have received anonymous phone calls ordering them to cease making critical comments on the Internet about the death of Isaiah Abraham. Those receiving these death calls from hell are told to shut up or face the consequences. But Isaiah Abraham was a major in the SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army) and bore the brunt of war so that those who do not speak for themselves would have the prospect of living the dream of freedom.  He is not a man whose name should be whispered with fear, not when he is dead. There are courageous statements in the media from many South Sudanese citizens who do not want to comply. Some of his readers say that if Isaiah Abraham wasn’t quiet, then no reason to quieten about his death when what killed him may still be out there.

What really killed Isaiah Abraham? My assumption is that many South Sudanese writers, bloggers, columnists, commentators, and their readers are in the full knowledge that what they write or read about is often not about themselves but what they ought the society to be for everyone. A commentator like Isaiah, who wrote till death, did so because he wanted to see an equitable, just, and fair society flourishing in South Sudan. It would conversely be of no much an interest to focus on the human face of who took the life of Isaiah Abraham. At this point, speculations are that his death, if methodically investigated, may not criminalize one individual but a system of some category. Believing this may be the case, then, logically, there is no prison structurally capable of hosting culprits of a crime of such enormity. South Sudanese too, are aware that investigations have been ordered in the past, and to present, no culprits have been incarcerated. The kidnapping and near-death torture of Deng Athuai, the Chairperson of South Sudan's Civil Society Alliance, is a case in point. Deng’s attempts to let the government disclose the names of seventy-five officials meekly implored in the letters sent to each one of them to return the money to the national treasury landed him in a sack, thoroughly beaten and left for dead just a few kilometers from the outskirts of Juba. Other tortures and disappearances have been reported. These tortures and now the death of Isaiah Abraham makes one believes that whoever kills and tortures cannot be found. Only what makes the killer so ferocious could be unwrapped.

The events leading to Isaiah’s demise are clear. Many think the country’s leadership is perching on shame for failing to restart oil flow and correspondingly, reeling in fear of an unforeseen seat-swapping civil unrest if things stand the way they are. It is important to note here that the South Sudan government remains the major employing sector in the country, and with ninety-eight percent of its budget coming from oil, stakes of discord can never be any higher. The private sector is yet to emerge. The quintessential truth rests on what citizens see; impending suffering might be looming. There is no economy that anyone would say is free-falling, rather, there is no real economic move from ground zero. On the political-economic front, neighboring Sudan holds the nation by the throat. No future date is set for oil flow insight, borderlands are being invaded, and prices of anything but everything are skyrocketing in the local markets. Frustration is comprehensible on the faces of the people. These and others are what Isaiah Abraham was commenting on.

The second last article he wrote mentioned his participation in the demonstrations. He was among the demonstrating crowd of the people of Northern Bahr el Ghazal and other areas who dissent Mile-14 and other borderlands in the security arrangement between Sudan and South Sudan. He also wrote strongly about South Sudan’s intransigence in dealing with the Sudanese rebels. The facts that Isaiah wrote about are strong enough. In fact, someone who is ill-trained in matters of national security would think he had trespassed too close. But he was miles away. Sometimes his controversial commentaries leave some with doubts as to what he was unto. Some thought Isaiah was the government, or at least, its agent. Until now, some people are yet to be convinced of who Isaiah Abraham really was. Even some of us who might have seen Isaiah physically would not be able to clear this mystique. However, in the face of this anonymity in the person of Isaiah, just as much as the anonymity of his killers would keep clouding our vision of the reality, one thing would be clear, with or without investigation into his death – the question of what killed him. Could Isaiah Abraham be a victim of ordinary crime - of which Juba is said to be notorious due to lack of effective crime-stopping mechanisms, or comments on Mile-14, Sudanese rebellions, leadership stagnation, fear of an uprising, lack of basic services in the country, or siphoning corruption? What is it?

Ordinary citizens who love South Sudan as a country and the shrewd Isaiah Abraham would be gratified in the ultimate justice if what killed him is systemically addressed. What killed Isaiah, when found, might probably be what is killing the nation. If Isaiah Abraham, a man without an opposition briefcase and following could die for his views, then South Sudanese opposition leaders in the like of Dr. Lam Akol are justified to oppose via remote control.