The devil is in the details of the South Sudan and Sudan oil agreement for Dinka Malual
September 27, 2012, will be remembered by Dinka
Malual of Northern Bahr el Ghazal as the month which brought back to life the
dark history over the control of the frontiers with the Rizeigat and the Baggara of southern Darfur. On that day, in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, President Bashir, and President Kiir swapped the rhetoric with brotherhood; new cowboy-hat-on-the-bald amity;
and together they signed an oil agreement which is courteously wrapped in the throngs
of other subsidiary agreements to form something angelic in the framework.
The entire deal, which comprised of nine
bilateral agreements, included the diabolic insertion of the Mile-14 pasture-land between Dinka Malual and
the Rizeigat into the national frames of both countries, thereby making it a
bitterly contested border zone. Panthou is already a thing of the past and the Abyei
referendum, always used as a winning bargain or peace mantle by South Sudan,
remains as elusive as ever. To Dinka Malual, nonetheless, the Mile-14 situation is
almost akin to the time between 1860 and 1880 when Zubeir Pasha formed forces
with the Rizeigat and drove Dinka Malual beyond River Kiir/Bahr el Arab. Though
Rizeigat had had the backing of the authorities most of the times that they
ventured southwards, their numerous attempts in the early twentieth century had
been prohibited forcefully by Dinka Malual. The result had been
continuous traditionally-acknowledged seasonal agreements between the
two communities on how to access pastures on either side of River Kir. It is
important to note that Dinka Malual never goes to Dar Rizeigat for pastures.
Always, it is Dinka Malual that is forced to open up and be accommodative.
And judging by the recent Kir-Bashir agreement, they have once again been
forced - perhaps sooner or later - to relent for the sake of peace that ought
to kill them. Of course, the anger is enormous in the Aweil community worldwide.
Some think they have been abandoned by their government through allowing
another opportunity for the marauding Murahaleen to resume
their rustling; while others view it as trading off of their land
for Abyei, a region that initially legally and administratively chose not to be
part of South Sudan. Common men are asking whether Aweil should shoulder Abyei's
problem. But the reality is that both Aweil and Abyei will always shoulder
their own problems with Rizeigat, Baggara, and Misseriya. And all have burdens to share
with South Sudan and Sudan.
Where is the Mile-14 conundrum, or what Magdi
Gigouli, a notable Rift Valley Institute scholar referred to as "Abyei in the
making," heading to? Might we be seeing old wounds being pricked once
again? Paul Malong Awan Anei, the governor of Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, a
former general in the SPLA army, a native of Dinka Malual whose part of his
native area lies within the Mile-14 area, and a veteran who sustained more than eight
bullet wounds from the Baggara as the then zonal commander in the Second
Sudanese Civil war in Aweil area Command Post, made no less show prior to the
conclusion of Kiir-Bashir talks in Addis Ababa. Upon sensing that his state’s
national security would be offered as a sacrificial lamb, he hastily went to the Ethiopian capital where he had talks with his boss, President Kiir, and the
mediating team. One is unsure if in the tense and pressurized atmosphere of the
negotiations Kiir was able to listen to him. His message to South Sudanese upon
returning to Juba, and to Aweil citizens, in particular, was no less categorical, "I
want to assure you that we are in the Mile-14 and we will be there to stay. This is
our area and we know how to manage relations," he said. He had indeed fumed
earlier on that implementation of such an agreement would be done when he is
not there. Whether this indicates a resignation or an old adage, ‘over my dead
body,’ is a matter open to interpretation.
The whole scenario of withdrawing SPLA forces
ten kilometers south of Kiir River thereby paving way for creating a safer
border demilitarised zone (SBDZ) carries an emotional charge among the Dinka Malual
of Northern Bahr el Ghazal. To the Rizeigat, it may mean an implementation of
the boundary which the British governor of Bahr el Ghazal, Mervyn Wheatley, and
the then governor of Darfur, Patrick Munro, agreed on and imposed in 1924. Dinka
Malual never accepted the agreement that went any mile beyond Kiir River. And to
Dinka Malual, it is another imposition in which they are never consulted that
had just occurred. The Sudanese had a delegation of Rizeigat presenting their
case to the African Union High Implementation Panel (AUHIP) while South Sudan
never spoke with Dinka Malual, the custodians of the border clues. This
already justifies trouble. Both Dinka Malual and Rizeigat are a surprise to one
another when it comes to what goes on along the Kiir River. In all the historical
wars on Kiir River, it begins with pastures, picks up in the water, culminates
in the rustling, and fully accelerates in the blood flow.
Many South Sudanese would not agree with the Mile-14 being a contested area. However, given the economical
implications that oil shut-down had created, sceptics perceive this
latest agreement as a sell-out to Khartoum for the oil to flow. Khartoum might
praise its negotiation skills and views the Kiir-Bashir agreement as a booty of war of
attrition. The economic implication of oil stoppage gives an impression that
South Sudan is dying for cash. The national treasury is running dry. In any
sense, South Sudan is now frantically paying heavily for halting its oil torrent
which constitutes the mildly spoken ‘lifeblood’ of the two nations by many
analysts. The craving for economic freedom that accompanied the government's decision
to stop the oil flow in the first place is now running down by an avalanche
of desperation. People are angry and hungry. When South Sudan shut down its oil earlier in 2012, hunger was a minute thing that could be sustained. What was at
stake was national pride and economic freedom. The South Sudan chief
negotiator, Pagan Amum - just like his countrymen and women who demonstrated
on the streets of Juba in support of the decision that halted oil transit through the theft-perforated pipeline of Sudan - asserted his contentment
saying it was a matter of national economic freedom. So it was, no doubt.
But to Dinka Malual, the adored economic
freedom is now forfeiting their land for cash. The freedom in demand for Malual
Giernyang or Malual Buoth Anyaar, as they fondly call themselves, is not only
economic or political, it is freedom from dispossession that they must counter
from any Sudan, be it South Sudan or Sudan. And as the governor asserted, so
are the people of Aweil who will have to join the land when it
goes north, or hang on to it to the detriment of peace between the two Sudans.
