The Dang And The Spear: Spiritual Warfare Over Leadership In South Sudan

Lomoyat: Addis. Church leaders, Yau Yau and GOSS

There are unrecorded sacred and manipulative spiritual games in the military and political lives in South Sudan. They happen between the churches and the shrines. They are games of supernaturalism, mingled with high capacity military and revolutionary experiences, and backed up with intellectualism befitting modern rationality. They are games where the gods are supplicated for luck, but when they (gods) renege on wishes and prayers, things get managed humanly violently. It leaves people awestruck whether education and military experience by some South Sudanese leaders mean anything in these mixed worlds of mindsets. Like it or not, leaders' tuning to spirituality influences how some affairs are managed in the country.

Over the past few months, politics in South Sudan has shifted from temporal to spiritual. But it was not only in the last few months that midnight calls to local super-visionaries were put on display by the leaders, and perhaps, the army. The practice had been around among South Sudanese societies where leaders venture out of profanity to spirituality, especially when events of unfavorable twists become uncontrollable through human force. 

In the case of the military, especially during the long war, some SPLA soldiers at the front lines went spiritual with intentions to survive attacks and military advances toward the enemy. Some prayed and others sought local spiritual help. There were SPLA soldiers who bragged of their purchased powers from local medicine men, spear-masters, and seers. The powers they got were thought to render bullets powerless in the events of shootouts. No force made it explicit than the famous Mobile Task Force (MTF). This amalgam was a tactical response special unit called upon when the swiftest firepower was needed on a particular front. It was said to have been made up of soldiers with impenetrable bodies - kind of bullet-proofed skins. Army rumours had it that in the events of launching attacks on enemy positions; if a Mobile Task Force soldier was not bullet-proofed enough, as was thought by his colleagues, he was tasked with the duties of preparing meals while the seemingly impenetrable ones did the fighting. The story could be wildly wrong, but MTF's victorious notoriety on the battlefields around Juba in the 1990s accorded them respect and some kind of immortality. 

Among the Sudan People's Liberation Army commanding officers, going spiritual was common too. Some commanders were rumoured to be possessing extraordinary powers that made them successful on the battlefields. There was a high-level rumour circulating that the baton carried by the SPLM/A Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), Dr. John Garang, was magically powerful and would tell which food was poisoned and which one was safe for the leader to feast on. The current president of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, was also rumoured to possess certain powers that would make him escape any attack deemed to kill everyone. In the early 1990s when he got involved in a plane crash in Western Kenya and walked away unscathed, the rumour nearly got logged in certainty. These are just some of the spiritual games that South Sudanese play when things are very hard and complicated.

Outside South Sudan, no one seems to be aware or cares to recognize the mystical African traditional unbroken beliefs in deities and spirituality among the leaders, and how such beliefs play important roles in both national and ethnic political sentience. It is now time to begin to envisage the impacts of these beliefs in national politics.

A simple glance at the current political leaders shows nothing different from what distressed soldiers used to do at the war fronts: going spiritual. In the continuing crisis, which began in late 2013, invisible games led the way between President Kiir and former vice president, Riek Machar. It began with the presumed prophetic zenith of Ngundeng, where it was prophesied that a left-handed man from the Nuer people would rule a country somewhere on the Nile. Ngundeng, as a Nuer prophet, was recorded in history, but his prophecies were seen as leaning toward folklores and were erratically subject to ahistorical oral tradition in which meanings and interpretations depend on successive generations' tastes and needs. In the traditional African oral histories, each generation is left to give meaning to some oral prophecies as the situations suit them. 

Factually, Ngundeng's prophecies are not taken for granted by Dr. Riek Machar and his community. He is believed by his community as the leader foretold by Ngundeng Bong to be that futuristic leader. Other  antedate prophets, or spiritual couriers such as Wurnyang, the former White Army's leading prophet of 1991 Bor massacre, and Dak Kueth, White Army's current leader responsible in part for the Armageddon of the same area, had continued to influence Dr. Riek Machar along that line to respond to his divine vocation: that a Nuer man must rule the country and he was the one. Machar's calls for President Kiir to step down confirmed his answer to the prophetic call. 

The trouble is that it is hard to know which country Ngundeng foretold. In the history of the area in The Nile Valley where South Sudan emerged, countries appeared, disappeared, and reappeared with different names. In Turkiyah Sudan, the Nuer people knew of their local Nuerland as their country. The British later arrived and changed the field of view. Then came South Sudanese independence and the name of the country in which Ngundeng’s prophecy would be fulfilled became harder to plot. From Nuer country to present-day South Sudan, many countries have evolved. Present South Sudan was part of the Sudan where the fulfillment of Ngundeng prophecies would have made more sense. I am convinced of Nuer's geographical expansion in the area after Ngundeng brought his prophecy of conquest to finality. Any other claims that go beyond that period are mere political-spiritual distortions for political gains.  But that is South Sudanese history of political divinities anyway. It matches perfectly with other proclaimed prophecies where a date is never stated on the actual occurrences of events.

When Dr. Riek Machar left Juba as a warrior in mid-December 2013, spiritual games began to take centerstage but were only known to some South Sudanese. Riek left Juba with the dang in his hand. The Dang was the magical stick once carried and, with disputations, used positively by prophet Ngundeng against the British. It was later taken away by the same British when the prophet's son commandeered powers after the death of his father. He is said to have displayed uncooperative manners towards the British authorities and had tried to use the dang to defeat them but failed. They killed him and took the dang away, purposely to stop the craze that people attached to the harmless weapon.  One wonders why the British decided to return it to South Sudan in 2010? It arrived back home, nevertheless, and Riek Machar took it into his custody. With dang around, political-spiritual matters reached a crescendo in Juba and elsewhere in the country. Riek is said to have stuck to the ownership of the stick with a deep interest in what it might give him.

On the government spiritual front, president Kiir never took the combined forces of his political arch-rivals and their prophets lightly.  He must have looked around for help which eventually came from afar on the African continent in the form of the prophet with an already failed prophecy.

Somewhere in West Africa, specifically in Nigeria, Prophet TB Joshua (looked down upon at home because of his low-level education in a country with more than 72 strong universities), announced that he saw a leader in East African country being captured. He stated that if the evil was not curtailed through prayerful intercessions, thousands of lives would be lost. His prophecy did not talk of thousands that would still be lost even if the doom that would befall the head of state was averted. As prophecies continue to become unbelievably wrong these days, no one paid attention to TB Joshua's prophecy until after the events of December 2013 in Juba. President Kiir, upon learning of it, wasted no time but wrote a thankful letter and sent a delegation to TB Joshua in Nigeria with the promise that when all is finished, he would attend, in person, the Assembly of God, presided upon by TB Joshua himself. He further requested that the prophet prayed for reconciliation in South Sudan. Joshua responded with more powerful prayers, but thousands went on to die and thousands more were displaced. 

But all was not resolved. Riek Machar's Dang continued to haunt president Kiir, who later got a backing of the Spear masters in his home state of Warrap to counteract the dang with the spear. That appeared to have ended the game of the gods. 

From the firmament of the sky, it looks like the spiritual scores have been settled. The locus of war has now descended down from up in the heavens where it all started. It is currently on the ground, on the battlefield, where the powers of the gods must merge with those of human leaders who are, in the end, the utmost beneficiaries of the apocalypses.

Dr. Riek Machar has officially named his rebellion as a resistance movement and subsequently sidelined the controversial detainees as part of his rebellion. This sways the calculus on the negotiations table. What appeared as the SPLM party's internal problems, needing internal solutions, has assumed a configuration that would make power-sharing arrangements a bitter possibility. 

Mediators in Addis Ababa will have to solve the SPLM party's problems and then turn to the rebellion whose demands would be far from the party's internal reforms. The rebellion is already feeling the pressure in regards to the question of political detainees - cum - coup plotters arrested by the government in Juba. Should the detainees become a political force, making eventual concessions with the government on reforms, the rebel group will need all of them, as one or separate bodies, to create a space. That means only one thing: the rebels are coming back to town with their armed militias, and that is another recipe for a potential renewed fighting in the capital, Juba. 

Solving this spiritual-political dilemma will be hard. But the right steps must be taken. IGAD and international mediators must consider involving civil society in the peace process and more so, the church. It would also do well if a conducive atmosphere for national reconciliation precedes mandatory elections, after which the country must be structurally redesigned for what should last, not what the prophets of gods are dictating.

‘Madina’ Bor In Bor

"What you see troubling people here, is your fault..." 

(General Malual Ayom speaking in Dinka to advancing troops on Bor).

 R-L: Gen: Malual is forth. Photo. Deng-Athoi Galuak

Talking about Bor can be tremendously challenging at times to a non-Dinka outsider because the word has a tendency to ping pong from being a name of the city of Bor proper (Popular informally as Mading Bor), to a descriptor of the Dinka section inhabiting the swathe of the Nile on the East Bank in Jonglei State. It is not even enough to stop here, but continuing on with etymology would mean making too many historical mistakes. Here, we are roughly talking of the city of Bor, Madina Bor, and perhaps Bor, the area, and the people.

From the colonial Sudan, unto independent Sudan – and South Sudan - the city of Bor had received umpteenth spotlights, both domestic and international for all reasons with good ones tipping the scale. But in the last thirty years, it had been the cataclysm that befell this serene city and her people that struggled to overshadow the best of it.  The period, 2013-2014, is a case period of tragedy; the latest of these tragedies being the destruction of the city and inhumane killings by the rebels set loose by Juba’s inefficiencies of governance and democratic misguidance.

In less than a month, Bor has changed hands four times between the rebels fighting the government, and the national army, the SPLA, which is defending ‘the country’ and the ‘constitution’ yet to be rectified. Division 8 General Peter Gadet Yak, based in Bor, defected with three brigades, per the narrative of the South Sudanese army, and stormed the city on the 17^th and 18^th of December, 2013, killing about a thousand civilians, wounding many more, and displacing all that remained mainly to Awerial County in the neighboring Lakes State on the West Bank of the Nile. Other vulnerable civilians unable to make a prompt escape tolerated the terrifying ordeal of sheltering in the city’s compound of United Nations Mission In South Sudan (UNMISS). The South Sudanese army later drove Peter Gadet out of the city.  A week later, the White Army mainly from Lou Nuer and Gaweer marched on the city once more, this time, on a counter-offensive with a prophetic mission of nonstop walk to Juba, the nation’s capital. Like in 1991, some villages on their way got burnt down and the people were killed indiscriminately. The march worried the nation and the world.

Residents of Juba were undeniably terror-stricken by the news of close to 25000 armed men eyeing their city of dwelling. The pressure was felt for real by those who live in the city and foreign others who knew that a violent elemental fall of Juba since its founding might unleash walking pilgrims from other armed and dissatisfied groups, hence, setting the stage for Africa’s Yugoslavia, with neighbors absorbing the shock waves of war. Rumors of war at the city’s gates were exacerbated by the newly embraced technology in the forms of mobile phones and the internet. International Media played its part to the dismay of the authorities who were themselves not impervious from trepidation. Mohamed Adow of Al Jazeera English Channel, who suggested that a reliable source told of a column of the White Army that slipped through the heavily militarized Juba-Bor road and was advancing on the capital was quickly sent packing to lessen the airing of unjustified fear. On the internet, the newly emerging nationalism disintegrated into ethnic chest-beating.

Further afield, responsibility then turned to frustration. The neutrality of president Museveni of Uganda was phenomenally compromised. As a member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) that hurriedly descended on South Sudan for the purposes of peace, Uganda’s South Sudan matched that of the Democratic Republic of The Congo, with the responsibility to protect (R2P) winning over the concealed evacuation of stranded nationals. What began as a peaceful mission became a mission to hunt for the vainglorious rebels or in defense of the indefensible abstractions. A warrior of Museveni’s character in a war zone is indisputably not an excellent peacemaker. With South Sudan’s geographical cauldron able to gulp down Uganda at least three times, President Museveni is well-versed that ‘going after’ Joseph Konyi is less wearisome than going after Riek Machar whose 25000 White Army’s firepower on one front almost doubles the firepower that propelled the Lion of the Ruwenzori Range into rebellious reign in Uganda, back in 1986.

Bor fell again to the national army on January 18, 2014, after almost a month of battling the ‘mobilized civilians,’ as the army spokesman, Colonel Philip Aguer, would like to assume. Actually, the city was found empty when the national army moved in after surviving heavy losses in ambushes on the way aboard Ute cars, barges, and tanks as a conventional army – a strange position opposed to the good old days of not being a sitting duck on the road. 

Just like the natives of this historically significant and embattled city would want to know, a perturbing question is: ‘why always Bor?’ The simple answer, among many, is that Bor is a victim of peace in a region that is otherwise peace wary. It is unwise to assume therefore that the people in this area are not doing enough to protect themselves when for generations they have done all they could to train, lead, fought and accommodated others for a national entity that would safeguard all South Sudanese. Note that Abel Alier and Joseph Lagu, first post-Addis Ababa Regional Government leaders of Southern Sudan went to Church Missionary Society School at Malek in Bor.

“...People have gone for business and abandoned the army, we have to lead the fight into Bor and the rest would follow us...,” 

General Malual Ayom continued his speech to an ululating battalion of the sons of the soil. He was clearly subdued by the loss of his colleagues, General Abraham Jongroor and Ajak Yen, Gadet’s first victims of rebellion (quote inaccurate…meaning retained). The fly-in-fly-out generals in the battle of Bor are to be warned that General Malual’s bravery must not be tried in the field, only at home. This was the same General Malual who was featured on the BBC video in an ambush, self-stripped of any weapons and walking with head held high amidst the showers of bullets and disorderly dashing soldiers. The question of why Bor can pick up another answer: because Bor thinks there is a nation, but alas! General Malual needs to take 'fault' blame somewhere else.

So, when the city of Bor speaks of resilience to bounce back in the face of Gadet's atrocities to all, including those who shot the first bullets of liberation in this city (Kerubino Kuanyin and William Nyuon were also Gadet's victims), they simply mean business.

Are Jailed South Sudanese Politicians In Juba Part of the Arms-Bearing Rebels?

Photo: Nyamilepedia

Whether the detained politicians in South Sudan are rebels by guilt or association is a question that takes one down memory lane to unending local, regional, and international requests for their unconditional release. The eleven prisoners were detained in connection with what the government insists as a coup attempt, but one stoutly countered by arms-bearing rebels and their international backers as a concocted incident to crack down on political rivals by President Kiir and his government. The claims and counter-claims of what really brought the country to where it is at the moment are difficult to verify, but an underlying truth stands out understandably clear: these detainees may not be firing at anyone, but their actions before the war and their status as prisoners are part of a puzzle of violence presently ensnaring the nation. 

What do we know about the prisoners in question?

The prisoners were people who roamed the political and military scenery of South Sudan for years and could best be linked to events and positions they shone in order to understand their merits. Here is what we know about them: they were all members of the ruling party; many were high ranking members of the Political Bureau and National Liberation Council of the ruling party; many were illustrious military officers before independence; some held ambassadorial, gubernatorial, and ministerial positions in the government until July 2013; as part of the government, many acquired significant friends with international powers; many were suspects in massive corruption that once prompted the president to meekly send out imploring letters for a return of four billion dollars into the national treasury; prior to December 15th, they were actively behind the former vice president, Riek Machar, pushing for reforms within the party; and above all, they made it clear to the nation, on more than one occasions, that their party has lost vision and direction. 

After their dismissal from the government, they became staunch critics of the government – a critical moment that ushered in the war. In custody, they are Deng Alor, former minister for cabinet affairs; Pagan Amum, former SPLM secretary-general; Cirino Iteng, former minister for culture; Madut Biar Yel, former minister for telecommunication and postal services; Oyai Deng Ajak, former minister for national security in the office of the president; Majak D’ Agoot, former deputy minister for defense; Chol Tong Mayay, former governor of Lakes state; Ezekiel Lul Gatkuoth, former ambassador to the United States; John Luk Jok, former justice minister; Kosti Manibe, former minister for finance; Gier Chuang Aluong, former minister for roads and bridges. They are all accused of plotting an abortive coup against an elected government.

Those conversant with the South Sudanese liberation history could see why their arrest or release is thorny but important. They wield a significant influence on the country's power dynamics. Their arrest or possible partaking in the ongoing rebellion is a better recipe that should convince the region and the world that the SPLM had treacherously fought for the creation of the nation, and correspondingly, demolishing it dangerously. 

Technically, from the list above, the SPLM is wholly in custody or back in the bush, with remnants heading the government.

Since the detention of these politicians and the subsequent outbreak of violence, call it with a proper name as war, the talks to divert the country away from another protracted war have hovered over nothing but their 'release,' as demanded by the rebels. Although the government accepts the demand for releasing them, it argues that their release must go through legal scrutiny to clear them from the alleged coup attempt. Having thus stolen the process toward the resolution of the conflict, their weight in South Sudanese politics as well as the ongoing conflict - duped as ethnic conflict - cannot be ignored. What is important to ask, is whether these detainees are really rebels, or are being verbally bailed out from detention to join the rebellion by the rebels themselves and others who demand their release? Behind the walls of their cells, one could ask if they really hold the key to the ongoing killings, or got the mechanisms to actually end it? The truth to these questions will be known in the future, though it will be rather too late. Likewise, the truth will reveal if the rebels are using their detention case to implicate them in a comprehensive mess for a comprehensive solution.

What is obvious is that the government is determined not to release these detainees unconditionally; for the action will definitely qualify the counter-argument that what actually took place on the night of December 15^th in Juba was not a coup but a political fiasco. The government sees itself losing legitimacy in the eyes of the public and would rather maintain its consistency with the claim of a coup attempt. This, therefore, begs further questions whether guns are buzzing because of these prisoners and whether those demanding their release are asking for peace through more rebellion? That is, swelling up the rebels' ranks for better prospects for peace. It is a call that needs to be tested for its genuine peace desire for the people of South Sudan. 

With negotiations currently enduring in Addis Ababa between the South Sudanese government and the rebels, led by Dr. Riek Machar, himself a former Vice President dismissed by President Kiir in an across-the-board presidential cabinet dissolution in July 2013, hints are that rebels have no interest in a ceasefire if the detained politicians are not released as a precursor to serious and realistic negotiations on the cession of hostilities. Many international voices have, too, ringed out starting from the UN, The USA, and the East African region. They all urge, but most of the time, demand the unconditional release of the political prisoners. But then the condition of their initial arrest is the one that never fully gets addressed. 

Why were they arrested in the first place? It is significant to factor in that the conditions of their arrest preceded the circumstances so violent that the situation demanding their release at present is tantamount to the situation of their initial arrest. Following through carefully, the government sees no difference between the gun-wielding rebels and the detained politicians. Michael Makuei Lueth, South Sudan's Minister for Information, had once said the detainees would only be released if the court of law of the land determined it so. And that if found guilty 'they will be hang by the neck until they are dead.' The fact that the prisoners are gathering international sympathy, drives the government crazy while equally inherently impacting the peace process and the halting of the conflict. This is the prevailing confusing condition for those attempting to make peace for South Sudan through talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 

Is there any reason why Dr. Riek Machar claims the detainees?

This question allows us to look back at the minute before the disaster. Their boycott, together with Riek Machar, of the final sitting of the National Liberation Council, confirms his reason for claiming them. When the spasm of war binge ultimately birthed out in Juba on December 15^th, these detainees and Riek Machar were the immediate targets for the arrest by the government. Machar circumvented arrest as a cardinal suspect of controversy: coup d’état versus armed rebellion, the former being the charge for which the detainees are in custody for. Riek Machar mysteriously slipped out of Juba and headed straight to the state of Jonglei where he officially raised his voice that a military armed rebellion was underway. He also denounced the allegations of a coup, and as a substitute announced the illegitimacy of the South Sudanese President, adding that he should step down.  

In another twist to be regretted later or might have already been, he called for the toppling of government through armed insurrection and pledged solidarity with the arrested colleagues. He is currently believed to be based somewhere in the marshlands of Nasir; the seat of his 1991 guerrilla base, or in Akobo; where he directs the marching battles of the White Army (a horde of armed youth with faces dappled with white ashes from burnt-out cow dung) or in Bor, capital of Jonglei; or anywhere on other frontlines in the Greater Upper Nile region. ‘Forced to’ yet again make painful decisions to go to war in a controversial episode of rebellion-cum-coup d’état, a seasoned warrior like Riek Machar gathers no blame for jumping into the woods rather than staying put in the capital. He quickly assessed the deteriorating political and security situations in Juba and came to an impulsive conclusion that, should it implicate him, as it came to be, he would face severe charges of treason with consequences he knew literally well might cost him an ultimate price.  Hence, the bush and not the bullets were, to him, the only options in order to make strategic meaning out of the chaos.

The past in Riek's Present

In essence, Machar is well known for his rebellious past than his personality. Upon setting foot in Jonglei, he effectively became the head of a ‘second liberation’ – as he declared to the BBC some days after he left Juba - against what he believed was President Kiir surreptitiously nurturing a ‘dictatorship’ through manipulations of SPLM (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement) party processes. It is to be recalled that when he first broke away from the SPLM/A in 1991, his first grievance among several reforms he wished for, was a chronic dictatorial nature of John Garang who then headed the liberation movement. Next on his list was the challenge to a one-way ideology of the New Sudan which, to his dissatisfaction, deprived southern Sudanese a chance for self-determination exercise in any events of peace deals with Khartoum.  The SPLM and its army wing later in 1994 made the reforms through a highly-publicized National Convention in Chukudum but deliberately failed to acknowledge the pressure behind such reforms. Riek Machar came back in 2002 with the drop of the slogan of ‘Garang Must Go.’ It was shelved for another period. That period came with his departure from Juba in December 2013. Thereafter,  he said ‘Kiir is no longer our president, he has to go.’ 

Although Riek Machar joined the list of South Sudanese post-independent rebels - many of whom were lured back into peace through numerous presidential pardons - he made it lucid in an interview to the BBC that he 'never thought he would consider becoming a rebel again 'in his lifetime.' As was the case in 1991, Dr. Riek goes with a huge following when he leaves, especially his tribesmen. In the present conflict, he is seen carrying under his arm what was the SPLM Mainstream or Torit Faction, in which the current president of South Sudan was an important leader, and his designed and recycled SPLM Nasir Faction back to the bush, or precisely, back to Nasir. Those that remained behind are the current leaders in detention. They are yet to make their decisions upon release whether they are for Riek Machar's armed conflict or not. But one thing is unmistakable: the detainees were, and might as well be, his SPLM’s archenemies, better equipped to disagree with him than President Kiir himself. It will be a great disclosure later if it became perceptible that they too share his wisdom of democratic change through violence or drip away namby-pamby. 

Some of the SPLM politicians such as the late Dr. Garang’s wife, Rebecca Nyandeng (guided by the spirit of John Garang as an esteemed mother of the incumbent government and the rebels alike), and Pagan Amum, now jailed, were vying for the highest office prior to the turmoil that has now cost the country the lives of about 10, 000 people (according to Brussels-based International Crisis Group) and displaced thousands.

A critical look through the ruling party, the SPLM, before violence, showed a cluster of politicians playing the game of using each other. Riek Machar was using other party colleagues to oust President Kiir, while behind him, the party was using Riek to pressure reforms in the SPLM, after which he himself would be clandestinely ousted when the democratic elections for the party's chief take place. In turn, and maintaining the government's position of a botched coup d’état, Riek Machar seemed to have dressed all the plans up in the form of a coup. This, to prisoners, would be a surprise if indeed they were immune.

The war in which everyone is desperate and reeling wild in search of the solution has become the war to release the prisoners. "Cease hostilities and release the detainees" appears to be the catchphrase for South Sudan's overtly denied but covertly accepted ethnic conflict. Other voices are, however, needed to pressure the government to speed up the due process of law in order to set the stage for their release. When the tides settle on the negotiations table, whether or not in the events of detainees' ultimate release, achieving a ceasefire to stop bloodshed would be the only thing to count on. To some extent, as I wrongly rephrase John Garang's view of peace in the two Sudan, 'there is no peace per se, even the graveyard is peaceful.'

Presidential Guards in Juba: Mistiming The Nation’s ‘Zero Hour.'

               

Pic: SPLA soldiers. Photo by Lomoyatdit

The eve of presidential guards’ clashes in Juba on December 14, 2013, trailed the long-awaited convening of the Political Bureau by the ruling party, The SPLM; whose political party structures had adhered to linearity in the order and commissioning of business since 1994 when the first National Conventions was convened in Chukudum, Eastern Equatoria. The business protocol of the party had been to convoke The National Convention, a gathering of several hundreds of delegates nationwide; The National Liberation Council, which is composed of no more than 275 members; The Political Bureau, whose membership stands at 27; and The General Secretariat, from where the start of the party national activities work their ways upwards through corridors of intervening powers.

The year 2013, however, introduced confusing changes. In the least, President Kiir on November 15, 2013, made a controversial dissolution of the party organs, a very surprising move that indicated was aimed at SPLM heavyweights who were recently part of the government, including Dr. Riek Machar; himself a self-declared aspirant for the party mantle for 2015 presidential elections. Consequently, the convening of National Liberation Council (NLC), contrary to the anticipated Politburo, took priority but did nothing to alleviate already simmering political temperatures over party leadership. SPLM party wrangling on power had had an immense impact on the nation’s viability three years into freedom.

As the president lambasted his opponents in NLC with claims of non-deviation from the movement since its inception, his deliberate reference to the 1991 Bor Massacre (already apologized for by Riek Machar and reluctantly forgiven by Bor communities) perforated old wounds and succinctly proclaimed a national doom in front of the ‘prophet of doom,’ as he later referred to Dr. Riek Machar. From that point, armed elements commenced mistiming of events in what has led to the death of scores of people, both civilians, and military personnel. Civilians have so far become the underdogs, caught in the crossfire, targeted for no reason, or locked in their homes without food or water in Juba. Reports have hinted that the Jonglei capital of Bor had come under heavy gunfire with several deaths reported.

Either it was a coup d'état or security forces mishandling reassignments in their quarters, The SPLM has tarnished its reputation by putting innocent lives at risk. Whatever the truth in the recent government rhetoric, the rhyme and whine over state power from the leaders carry the blame for the current state of affairs in Juba.

South Sudan has a history of rebellions which had been made excessively ethnical during the decades of war of independence. It is a reality that can be seen in all aspects of life in the country. It’s, therefore, the responsibility of the SPLM leadership to have acquainted itself with this reality by urging leaders to refrain from using ethnic cards in their power manipulations. It is now apparent that the much-internationalized marginalization of the people had been put to an end with the achievement of sovereignty. The unknown components of democratization have proved so alien to South Sudanese governing guerrillas. Tranquil years starting from 2005 to 2013 sowed hope that the country was in the best stage of democratic progression. This is not to dismiss David Yau, George Athor, and other rebels who were dissatisfied with democratization processes, service delivery profanation, and grand systemic corruption. Yet, the country was, by and large, seemed hopeful.

But cynics had a point. South Sudan had nevertheless continued to offer messianic credence to many who predicted her current affairs. A lot had been said about the people of South Sudan before the nation entered a defining moment in 2011; when for the first time, South Sudanese became their own masters. Concerns ranged from the inability of the people to govern themselves democratically, to possible intolerance of human rights. None of those predictions failed to prove wrong. There have been concerns of possible ‘Somalization’ or ‘Balkanisation’ of the country. Such concerns were perceived by ordinary citizens as voices not so divergent from the clenched fists of a coloniser’s misconstructions of innate abilities of the people. But the people’s party has never been at par with them.

Many South Sudanese are not in the know why The SPLM has become such a demigod that politicians fear to exit or lose it. Clamouring for the SPLM tells ordinary South Sudanese that our guerrilla-turned-politicians have nothing better to offer when conferred with state power other than stressing liberation history through the party to predominantly uneducated masses in the rural areas. There is no reason why the politicians who are supposed to be judicious and charismatic shy away from forming their own parties to offer a formidable challenge to the ruling elites which, in fact, is one way to peaceful resolutions of political squabbles. There is equally no reason why the governing SPLM flayed party processes which are part of a democratic transformation. If the politicians have faith in the people of South Sudan; strong confidence and clarity on the policies they wish to implement for the people, then they should not have permitted the bloodshed for the past three days (Dec., 15^th, 16^th, and 17^th), and days to come.

To the South Sudanese army, civilians would have disciplined their politicians through the ballot box. You have mistimed their zero hour.

Abyei: Abandoned In Unilateral Referendum

Photo credit: Lwal Baguoot

Another summit has lately gone by without agreement between the two presidents: Bashir and Kiir over the future of Abyei. Abyei’s question had tumbled down to a two-man dialogue from both its international and national projection as a deciding region of statehood for South Sudan and possibly, Sudan. It is now an issue of table manners for the two heads of state. Since none of the presidents is ready to correct his manners, deadlock continues to rule. What is wrong with the future of Abyei?

Some people in the Republic of Sudan call it the Kashmir of the Sudans by, perhaps, inaccurately contrasting its geographical location, ethnic composition, strategic national security and resources implications, and religious affiliation to the region at the foothills of the Himalayas, which is controversially administered by three nations: China, India, and Pakistan. A very unfortunate comparison indeed! However, judging by the look of insanity involved in the two regions, Abyei could easily and sadly qualify had the decisive dissimilarity not been that of its history. By settlement, Abyei cannot and has never been synonymous in character with Kashmir. The notoriety of claims by Sudan through Messeriya transhumance is the problem of the area. Abyei is a region claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan. It sits perilously on the borders of the two staunched enemies (South Sudan, to Sudan, is the number two enemy state after the state of Israel). It has long been seen along with several other areas as a conflict flashpoint on the North-South borders of Sudan. Its inhabitants are, according to the 2005 Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement, nine Ngok Dinka, and others.

Ngok is a Nilotic section of Dinka broadly famous among other Dinka sub-tribes as Ngong Deng Kuol/Majok or Ngong Abyei. Historically, the family of Arop Biong through Kuol Arop and Deng Kuol or Deng Majok and other descendants in the line maintained the chieftaincy of Abyei in what was the volatile part of the last quarter of 19^thC and first quarter of 20^thC. This period, according to historians with authority on Sudan such as Douglas Johnson, was when the area experienced intense slave raids.

Pragmatically, Sudanese Arabs saw venturing south through Abyei as a mission of advancing Islamization to the rest of Africa by whatever means necessary. Most of the time, it was through aggression: slave raids, trade, accessing resources forcefully, or cultural conquest. Oral histories along the borders of Sudan and South Sudan bear no wickedness in stating that the coming of Arabs to Sudan has led to embittered relationships of all times. Along the borders, the Jieng, the Naath, and the Collo continue to tell vigilante stories due to unforeseen attacks. Security at the borders has always continued to be a blister needing caution even from the depth of sleep. Records reveal that an administrative transfer of Abyei to Kordufan in 1905 was a means to curtail or lessen aggressiveness towards Ngok. Aggression towards Ngok has mostly been engendered by the Messeriya section of Humr; now claimants of the nativity by transhumance through Abyei.  

Other inhabitants of Abyei are non-Ngok Dinka but those who have lived there for generations. These are the ‘others’ acknowledged in the Machakos protocol on Abyei. Note that "other" is an ogre of malevolence and a significant term of substance in Abyei’s case. The owners of the land, the Ngok Dinka, at their own discretion cannot shed off the term even if asked to do so. From "others," we get the presence of Messeriya Arabs in Abyei who are either historically a welcome group of individual settlers among the population or those who weaved into Ngok communities through intermarriages. If you ask the Ngok Dinka what others in Abyei are, they will precisely point out that so and so over there are the ‘others’ in their region. Ask anyone in Khartoum and the list may include the planes that fly above the region – a deliberate misunderstanding of facts. So, who are the real Messeriya in Abyei? 

From the snapshot above, it should be easy to place Abyei in its rightful place. As the month of October 2013 concludes, sureness and inviolability of life for the natives in Abyei will depend, for better or for worst, on the decision that will be taken by the majority. Indeed, emotions from failures of the AUHIP and UN Security Council have driven the citizens of Abyei and sympathizers in general to feelings of dissatisfaction, uncertainty as well as a bolstered enragement. Why would they not harbor these feelings when daily life in the region is a terrifying ordeal: full of uncertainty, deprived of the natural bequest in terms of oil resources, constantly threatened by Messeriya Arabs and for the unknown session, held between the two mystical states that would never ever agree on anything without coercion? Successive deliberations and negotiations processes have stalled indefinitely leaving Ngok community as in-betweens of Khartoum and Juba.  It is on these uncertainties that the citizens of Abyei have decided, stealthily perhaps, to hold an independence referendum to determine their national status.  

Of course, there is a worry. The plebiscite is eclipsed by anecdotal evidence that the Messeriya, armed by the Sudan government and given assurance that they too belong in Abyei, may likely cause a bloodbath. Also, Satellite images from Satellite Sentinel Project (SSP) of the Hollywood actor George Clooney and John Prendergast of Enough Project have reported extraordinary Sudanese military activities from their bases closer to Abyei. Sudan has a potted history of taking advantage of precarious situations. The invasion of Abyei in 2010 in which thousands of civilians were displaced serves as evidence. The killing of the paramount chief of Abyei, Kuol Deng Kuol, while accompanied by United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA) has further exacerbated the resolve to go ahead with the vote.

What is the position of South Sudan in this mess? The vocal push by South Sudanese politicians and notable figures had fuelled the desire for the citizens of Abyei to go forward with voting decision regardless of formal agreement on the matter. One is surprised by the South Sudan government's reversion in tone and support for the people of Abyei. Whatever eventuality that the people of Abyei may encounter, South Sudan should know that it is part of it. Denial of reality is simply unprincipled and dangerous.

It would have made rational sense if the two countries had resolved Abyei’s self-determination exercise in a manner that reckons responsibility and value of human life. Leaving the inhabitants of Abyei to decide their own fate is indistinguishable from entrenching inter-state animosity between the two countries and between Abyei and its Messeriya neighbours for eternity.  It is too late now.  

In answer to the question of the real Messeriya, consider that every year millions of passengers go through Heathrow Airport in the UK on their way to greener pastures anywhere in the world. If by strange happening UK votes to determine its fate, whether to go to Mars or remains on earth, it will be only the Whites indigenous and Chinese or Indian or African ‘others’ permanently based in The UK as citizens that will determine UK’s future.  Not millions of Chinese, Indians and Africans that go through Heathrow. The Messeriya on maroon cows passing through Abyei are comparable to the passengers on an Airbus A380 passing through the UK. It is the transit fee that is needed to be paid.

Ad Hoc Technocracy In South Sudan

Photo credit, owner. Pagan Amum, SPLM SG. 

Finally, the push has come to shove in Juba. In a move that dazed many South Sudanese as well as international observers of political developments in South Sudan, President Salva Kiir Mayardit had on 23rd July 2013 bravely dissolved his government. It was highly anticipated but vulgarly engendered by poor government performance and the struggle for power within the ruling party, the SPLM. The multiple presidential decrees relieved the vice president, 29 ministers, 29 deputy ministers, and 17 brigadier generals in the police force. Another promised an overhaul of the government ministries while the SPLM Party Order suspended the Secretary-General of the SPLM. The SG, in another capacity, functioned as the chief negotiator in the post-independent arrangements with Sudan

As could be construed in these shake-ups, all efforts seemed to have been designed to prioritize the efficiency of the government. However, punishing dissent and rewarding supporters often go along with situations of this nature. It will be clear in the formation of the next government if all intentions were for the good of the nation or actions that are circumspect disciplinary among the SPLM's heavyweights.  The dissolution has already been believed by many as targeting the removal of the vice president, Riek Machar Teny, who had on numerous occasions, criticized the government while voicing his wish to lead the party into the next elections. 

The president's application of his constitutional prerogative was the second since he took power as the new country's first bearer of the highest office after independence. He had reshuffled the same government in 2010, but with the least panic from the street. Many more were expected but did not materialize. As some residents in Juba confirmed, the situation had since changed. The city remained tense, making the likelihood for a small bang of any kind to disrupt the day. On the other hand, citizens who have been calling out for the government to do more are now shy of praise even though their wishes are being slowly fulfilled. The need for effective service delivery had been overshadowed by fear of violent reprisal from the demoted government officials who might be left out of the incoming government, especially from the outgoing Vice President and his supporters. However, I am of the belief that Riek Machar had done his calculations correctly, and the presumptions many might have for him – especially his penchant for power in which he often applies violence in its pursuit –  have something to do with his past, not his present. But who can testify for Riek? He is a man cut for his own desires and might do exactly what people think he couldn't. 

Cognizant of the oil shutdown and the war with the Sudan in Panthou, South Sudanese see this second reshuffle as exceedingly bizare but on equal terms with previous actions in which proper plans were reserved to be attempted afterwards. The plan is now for the president to sit down with his advisers and do the mammoth task of selecting the new cabinet while the government in Juba remains literally in the hands of technocrats in the respective ministries. It was simple to set the pace of restructuring, but the enormity of the task at hand might likely require weeks to complete. That would leave a vacuum for possible unruliness. The president must act fast and in the approved manner in his formaton of a new government.

Can the president be encouraged to be a little harder? If President Kiir is to be beleived and trusted, he has to do a bit more. Whether internal party wrangling for leadership might have caused the dissolution, South Sudanese and the world are wishing to see that the 75 officials whom he sent letters to return the stolen US$4 billion must not show faces in the next government.  Of course, if the wells of the decrees have not run dry, expectations are that few remaining decrees must be channeled towards the formation of investigation committees to probe the whereabouts of US$4 billion for the benefit of the impoverished citizens.